All economies, whether democratic or totalitarian, depend heavily on the data flows through undersea data cables. Without digital trade, our everyday lives would be difficult to imagine. In the Baltic Sea region, all coastal states rely on these vulnerable data cables, two of which were recently cut. The Baltic Sea is shallow but serves as a lifeline for my home country, Finland. With the longest land border in the EU with Russia at 1,300 km, we also share an extensive sea border with the Baltic Sea.

A Chinese ship operating from Russia carried out the most recent cable cutting. A Chinese vessel previously cut a gas pipeline and a data cable a year ago. Why, you might ask? One possible motive is that they are testing reactions for Russia and for China’s strategic purposes. If China were to initiate a military blockade of Taiwan, it could start by severing cables and launching large-scale cyber operations, alongside jamming satellite navigation and communications. This may sound familiar. It appears that Russia and China, who claim to be close allies, are testing and optimizing their tactics together. To emphasize this, Russia has conducted intense cyber-attacks and jamming of satellite signals in the Baltic region.

The cables and pipelines are too vulnerable to sabotage within the context of hybrid warfare against the West. We must replace these cables with active wires and pipelines equipped with sensors to detect harmful activities. Additionally, we need to deploy undersea surveillance drones and build deterrence against hostile actions. We must eliminate the plausible deniability that Russia often exploits. They perceive us as weak and are becoming increasingly bold in their ”grey zone” warfare. If we continue to show weakness, Russia may one day escalate this into a full military operation.

As the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is ambiguous about the actions we should take, we must be bold enough to board, detain ships, and prosecute their crews, as outlined in the Telegraph Cable Law from the 1880s.

The role of the private sector is crucial since it owns and operates much of this infrastructure. It is vital that security regulations incentivize these entities to build active rather than passive resilience against geopolitically motivated hostile actors.

The European Union has a mission to safeguard underwater cables from potential threats. This involves collaboration with other member states to develop relevant capabilities, expected to be completed by 2035—far too late.

We must establish firm lines regarding hybrid attacks that cannot be crossed; if they are, a decisive and harsh response will follow. If Russia and its allies threaten us by severing energy or data flows, we will respond not only through sanctions but also by limiting and cutting off Russia’s own flows.

Russia depends on its access to the global internet through a few cables, one of which runs through Finland.

It is not just the cables and data flows that are hindering banks and companies in the region and globally. Furthermore, they facilitate Russian state-sponsored cyber sabotage and criminal activities, which have been increasing in the absence of active countermeasures. Mere passive resilience building is insufficient.